

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending June 19, 2015

R. Oberreuter was at Y-12 to augment site rep coverage.

Building 9212/ Radiological Controls (RADCON): Last week, a Production chemical operator discovered contamination on his company-issued work clothing after exiting a high contamination area. The operator was supporting a Maintenance work package to replace the end cap on the intermediate evaporator system product tank in C-1 Wing. When the chemical operator subsequently exited the area, he encountered difficulty in doffing his anti-contamination clothing. The adhesive seal covering the zipper of his coveralls would not peel open, forcing him to apply sufficient force to begin to tear the suit to access the zipper and remove the coveralls. The contamination was detected when the Personnel Contamination Monitor alarmed during the exit survey. RADCON personnel responded and detected low levels of alpha contamination on the chest area of his company-issued scrubs. The chemical operator did not receive any contamination to his personal clothing or skin. During the fact finding meeting this week, CNS postulated that the chemical operator brushed up against contaminated equipment and, while struggling to doff his coveralls, spread the contamination from the protective suit to his company-issued clothing. CNS management is providing a briefing to operators to reinforce the need to call for assistance from RADCON personnel if difficulties are experienced during doffing of protective clothing to prevent the spread of contamination.

CNS Nuclear Safety Oversight: Last week, the site reps met with the new CNS director that will lead the nuclear safety oversight function under CNS' Nuclear Operations Support organization. When CNS took over the contract in July 2014, most of the positions in this oversight organization were vacant. In November 2014, CNS responded to concerns expressed by NPO by assigning a senior manager within the Mission Assurance organization to focus full time on providing mentoring and strengthening the response to events until that function could be fully staffed (see 11/28/14 report). This new director is looking to fill several staff positions for critique mentors and several more positions providing oversight of operations at Y-12.

Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM): URS/CH2M Oak Ridge (UCOR), the contractor for the Melton Valley Closure Project, informed OREM that the Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) related to a detonation hazard is cancelled based on the recent implementation of a safety basis revision. In May 2014, UCOR declared a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA) based on new information indicating that certain stored drums have a potential for a detonation event versus a deflagration event assumed in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) (see 5/16/14 report). Similarly, the Transuranic Waste Processing Center contractor (TWPC), Wastren Advantage Inc. (WAI), cancelled a JCO for the same hazard by including new specific administrative controls in the recent DSA revision that prohibits the movement and processing of these drums.

TWPC: WAI completed its contractor readiness assessment (RA) of the start of operations using the new overpack that will be used during the transport of remote-handled canisters to UCOR storage facilities. The RA team had one finding in that the form used to document the inspection of the overpack prior to loading did not have a method to indicate as found conditions. Additionally, the team noted that WAI personnel demonstrated excellent 3-way communications on the radio and face-to-face that enhanced the safety and efficiency of the evolutions observed.